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Purpose - Board of directors is essential ingredients of corporate governance mechanism that 
achieve in monitoring managers’ performance by instituting good corporate practice and protecting 
the best interest of shareholders to ensure adequate investment return (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; 
Mansor, Che-Ahmad, Ahmad-Zaluki & Osman, 2013). However, the recent financial scandals 
that led to the crash of big companies across the globe and Nigeria in particular raised grave 
concern on the effectiveness of board monitoring gimmicks hitherto presumed to shield investors’ 
interest and control managers opportunistic behaviors (Ebrahim, 2007). The lack of adequate 
disclosure provisions characterized by the defunct Nigerian Accounting Standards (SAS) and 
the use of the outdated governance code gave managers the opportunity to engage in earnings 
management. The same reason has led to the market crash of 2008 (Ikpang, 2008; Adeyemo, 
2012). Furthermore, audit committee’s poor performance had led to impairment of auditors’ 
independence which caused accounts overstatement (Punch, 2015). Against the backdrop of the 
ugly situation, new corporate governance was put in place in 2011with additional power to monitor 
managers’ opportunistic behaviors in addition to the amended companies act (SEC 2011, CAMA, 
204). The focus of this paper, therefore, is to determine the board of directors and the audit 
committee’s effectiveness under the 2011 revised code and CAMA. To ensure whether the new 
regulation put in place can effectively monitor firms’ managers and suppress their opportunistic 
behaviors to protect shareholders best interest in the banking and insurance sectors. The study 
covers the period of 2011 to 2015.
Literature Review - Relevant literature suggests that board’s decisions and responsibilities are 
carryout on behalf of the shareholders (Marra, Mazzola & Prencipe, 2009) and a high proportion 
of independent directors can effectively reduce agency cost (Patelli & Prencipe, 2007). Because 
outside directors with high managerial know-how and with an established reputation can reduce 
connivance with top management, in particular, palliate agency problem (Fama & Jensen, 1983). 
Prior studies argue that earnings management is reduced considerably due to the board’s 
independence, diligent and audit committee effectiveness (Marra et al., 2009). Additionally, 
brand name auditors such as Big4 associate with higher audit quality outcome (Francis & Yu, 
2009). Recent studies document a significant negative relationship between external audit and 
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earnings management (Khalil & Ozkan, (2016). In contrast, other studies report a non-significant 
association between external audit and earnings management (Sun et al., 2011). Furthermore, 
audit committee size and its diligent can enhance the effectiveness of the committee (Karamanou 
& Vefeas, 2005).
Summary - The results indicate BINDP, ACCHR and AUDL are negative and positively related 
to EM hence, can reduce the magnitude of EM by parameters -0.0473623, -0.0963037 and 
-0.0422615 respectively. The results also cast doubt on the notion that a Big4 as a proxy for audit 
quality (AUDQ) is related to lower earnings management. Contrary to our expectation, ACSIZE 
and LEV are positive and significantly related to EM. It, therefore, means ACSIZE does not support 
the advocate of resource dependence theory who canvases for larger audit committee size. LEV 
can create some doubt to lenders and perhaps denied the opportunity to monitor management. 
As for firm size (SIZE), the result is negative and significant. The result is consistent with prior 
studies such as by (Jensen 1986) indicating that larger firms tended to choose stricter governance 
regulations hence, reduce opportunistic managers’ behaviors.
Methodology - The study employs panel data technique to analyze the effect some board 
characteristics, audit committee and audit quality on earnings management in Nigeria using 
Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors. The method is effective for correcting serial correlation 
and heteroskedasticity. It also takes care of small sample. Data collected for the fiscal year 2011-
2015 from the annual report and Thompson Reuter’s database. The study adopted and used 
the modified Jones accrual model and the absolute value of the residuals for estimating in the 
regression equation.
Results
  Drisc/Kraay Robust Standard Errors   
Variable Coef. Std. Err. t Pv
BINDP -0.0473623 0.0034022 -13.92 0.000
BDLG 0.0528965 0.0174564 3.03 0.039
ACCHR -0.0963037 0.0329429 -2.92 0.043
AUDQ 0.1869251 0.1165021 1.60 0.184
ACDL -0.0422615 0.0130755 -3.23 0.032
ACSIZE 0.2800868 0.0730222 3.84 0.019
LEV 0.1952362 0.0351018 5.56 0.005
FSIZE -0.1729228 0.0409095 -4.23 0.013
_cons 1.578231 0.2889597 5.46 0.005
Overall, the results indicate that board of directors with a high proportion of outside directors 
with an adequate number of meetings can effectively constrain EM. The audit committee chair 
with a financial expert can also suppress EM as well as adequate audit committee meetings and 
firm size. In contrast, Big4 cannot curve EM despite market dominance in Nigeria. The result is 
consistent with several previous studies (Marra et al., 2009; Mansor et al., 2013).




The paper address the issue of whether the board of directors’ characteristics is instrumental in 
constraining earnings management in a sample of Nigerian highly regulated banks and insurance 
firms. Using Driscoll and Kraay’s robust standard errors with fixed effect, the study provides 
evidence that a higher proportion of outside directors is related to more effective monitoring 
in constraining earnings management. Findings form the study have vital policy implications. 
Regulators, therefore, should pay more attention to the process of financial reporting to restore 
and maintain investors’ confidence. Future research should consider whether the adoption 
International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) can constraining earnings management, 
other explanatory variables such as financial experts, audit tenure as well as the functions of 
shareholders as members of the audit committee can enhance reporting quality and curve EM. 
Furthermore, the research should also extend to the non-financial sector to see the effect of the 
revised 20011 CG codes and CAMA.
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